Kelly H. Chang's Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy PDF

By Kelly H. Chang

Targeting how the President and the Senate impression financial coverage by means of appointing Federal Reserve Board individuals, this e-book solutions 3 questions on the appointment strategy and its results. First, do politicians effect financial coverage through Federal Reserve appointments? moment, who impacts the process--only the President or the President and the Senate? 3rd, how is the constitution of the Federal Reserve appointment strategy defined? The research extends the research of the Federal Reserve Board to the eu relevant financial institution.

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Extra resources for Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

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X12}. In order to be complete, I quickly provide the formal details. For any y ∈ {x7}, SQ1 = x6. The nonunique correspondences between x and SQ2 are defined for any x such that: (1) x ≤ x5 ⇒ (2) x ≥ x8 ⇒ x5 + x6 = L3 2 x6 + x8 SQ2 = = H3 2 SQ2 = The unique correspondences are: (3) x5 ≤ x ≤ x8 ⇒ L3 < SQ2 = x + x6 < H3 2 Thus the total range of outcomes for y ∈ {x7} is L4 ≤ SQ2 ≤ H4. 5): if y ∈ {x8, x9, x10, x11, x12} For any y ∈ {x8, . . , x12}, SQ1 = x6. 2 The Appointment Process Model The unique correspondences are defined for any x such that: (3) x5 < x < x7 ⇒ L3 < SQ2 = x + x6 < H3 2 Thus the total range of outcomes for y ∈ {x8, .

Essentially he gains leverage from his first-mover advantage. In Case 1, if the Senate moved first rather than the president, the outcomes would be either S or the president’s indifference point, much as the current Case 2 is favorable toward the president. In Case 2, the outcome would be S rather than P or SQ− ; there would be Senate dominance. But in the current constitutional setup, because the president is the agenda setter, he can use this advantage in order to obtain a point closer to or identical to his ideal point in either of the first two cases.

1 The Data The estimation uses two new datasets of FOMC voting and Senate Banking Committee signals, and two existing datasets for the presidents and economic variables. 1. 2). This dataset is a panel of each FOMC member’s vote (for tighter or easier policy) at the approximately monthly meetings during the period 1970–95. ” The coding involved a two-step process. ”24 When the FOMC decided to maintain prevailing conditions, 24 A binary rather than a three-level variable is used because individuals rarely truly vote for the status quo.

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