By David E. Lindsey
A narrative historical past through a Fed insider of ways financial coverage is formed within the US, with specific emphasis at the performances of former Chairman Ben Bernanke and present Chairwoman Janet Yellen in dealing with the prelude, outbreak, and aftermath of the 2008 monetary crisis.
Read or Download A Century of Monetary Policy at the Fed: Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and the Financial Crisis of 2008 PDF
Best money & monetary policy books
During this rigorous learn of John Maynard Keynes's perspectives on fiscal idea and coverage from 1920-1946, Professor Meltzer argues that a few of Keynes's major principles were neglected or misstated. whereas awareness has considering temporary countercyclical rules, the most coverage implications were missed.
Years have handed because the international skilled one of many worst monetary crises in heritage, and whereas numerous specialists have analyzed it, many critical questions stay unanswered. should still cash construction be thought of a ‘public’ or ‘private’ activity—or either? What can we suggest through, and need from, monetary balance?
- European Economic Integration And South-East Europe: Challenges And Prospects
- Deception and Abuse at the Fed: Henry B. Gonzalez Battles Alan Greenspan's Bank
- The 21 Success Secrets of Self-Made Millionaires
- Divisia Monetary Aggregates: Theory and Practice
- Standard & Poor's Fundamentals of Corporate Credit Analysis
Extra resources for A Century of Monetary Policy at the Fed: Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and the Financial Crisis of 2008
He took it on faith that the New York Reserve Bank was the natural locus of system authority, since financial markets were concentrated there. Growing Pains ● 21 Strong disliked the low Treasury interest rates that created a virulent inflation during and after the war. By November 1919 he thought that the time had passed for raising rates without precipitating a crisis. Thus, he probably would have opposed, and perhaps moderated, the ill-fated hike in the rates charged by the Reserve banks on discount loans of funds to commercial banks.
Robert L. Hetzel wrote: The stock market boom in the last half of the 1920s prompted the next instance of purposeful deflation after 1919–1920. In the 1920s, gold inflows rather than advances from the discount window became the primary source of Federal Reserve credit. 6 Strong’s worsening illness followed by his death in October 1928 contributed to the leadership vacuum, and policy continued to drift. To make matters even worse, a conflict over how to deal with ever-rising equity prices flared up in 1928–1929 between the Reserve banks, especially New York, and the Board.
14 But before then, Temin pointed to the sizable dip in consumption and investment demands, only part of which he attributed to the declines in income and wealth associated with the crash in stock prices. The rest largely owed to unexplained shifts in spending propensities relative to income of the kind Keynes emphasized. Surely, too, the declines in income and market transactions in dollar or nominal terms early in the Great Depression reduced the public’s need for money to facilitate the diminished transactions.